



THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE
PINOCHET CASE
MICHAEL BYERS*
[T]his sovereign authority which is a State’s own right, does not at
present have an absolute character, not even in the internal order,
due to the international atmosphere reigning in the world.  When su-
per-states and international organizations appeared, the field of ac-
tion of the State’s power became more and more limited, due to
agreements and treaties that are subscribed in the international arena.
Multiple obligations and restrictions that nations contracted with
each other and with international organizations, have left them virtu-
ally without sovereign liberty.
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte1
I.  INTRODUCTION
On a Friday evening in October 1998, General Augusto Pino-
chet, the eighty-two year old former general and dictator of Chile,
was arrested in London by the Metropolitan Police at the request of a
Spanish magistrate.  Thus began a saga with profound implications
for the substance, enforcement, and public perception of international
law.  The Pinochet case2 involved—and will have a significant impact
Copyright © 2000 by Michael Byers.
* Associate Professor, Duke University School of Law; formerly a Fellow of Jesus Col-
lege, Oxford and an adviser to the coalition of human rights organizations (Amnesty Interna-
tional, Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, Redress Trust, Association of
the Families of Disappeared Prisoners) that intervened before the House of Lords in the Pino-
chet case.  Some of the information in this essay is drawn from my own recollections, and is
therefore unsupported by citations.  I am grateful to the participants in a workshop on “Persua-
sion and Norms in International Relations,” held at Duke University on January 21 and 22,
2000, for their insightful comments.
1. AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE, INTRODUCTION TO GEOPOLITICS 147 (1968).  At the
time the book was published, Pinochet was teaching at Chile’s Army War Academy.  This pas-
sage was drawn to my attention by James Silver, J.D., M.A, Duke University, 2001.
2. For the purposes of this Essay, “Pinochet case” will be used to refer to the whole se-
quence of the political, diplomatic, and legal proceedings.  This Essay also discusses the Pino-
chet case in relation to its individual proceedings in the British courts: Augusto Pinochet Ugarte,
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upon—a number of legal areas, including international criminal law,
human rights, state immunity, jurisdiction, extradition, and the rela-
tionship between international law and domestic legal systems.3
The case cannot be fully understood solely from a legal perspec-
tive.  A variety of non-legal factors shaped both the proceedings and
the outcome: domestic politics; international diplomacy; the arms
trade; the individual personalities, backgrounds, and self-perceived
roles of judges and politicians; the activities of non-governmental or-
ganizations, transnational corporations, and the growth of transna-
tional networks between judicial authorities from different countries;
and the media and international public opinion.  Given the array of
legal issues and non-legal factors involved, the Pinochet case provides
an excellent window into the complicated relationship between inter-
national law and politics.4  This Essay seeks to take advantage of this
opportunity, explaining how the existence of legal rules and institu-
tions shaped the options available to judges and politicians involved
in this case, and ultimately constrained their behavior.
II.  PINOCHET IN CONTEXT
Pinochet was accused by Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzon of
having, in the decades following his 1973 violent overthrow of the
democratically elected government of President Salvador Allende,
authorized (or at least knowingly permitted) the torture, disappear-
[1999] 38 I.L.M. 68 (Q.B. Div’l Ct. 1998) (referred to as “Divisional Court” in the text); R v.
Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.
1998) (referred to as “Pinochet I” in the text) annulled by R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipen-
diary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2), 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L. 1999) (referred to as “Pi-
nochet II” in the text); R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte, 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L. 1999) (referred to as “Pinochet III” in the text).
3. For a legal analysis of the Pinochet case, see generally J. Craig Barker, The Future of
Former Head of State Immunity after ex parte Pinochet, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 937 (1999); An-
drea Bianchi, Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 237
(1999); Michael Byers, Decisions of British Courts During 1999 Involving Questions of Public
International Law, 70 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 277, 277-95 (1999); Christine Chinkin, In
Re Pinochet, 93 AM. J. INT’L L 703 (1999); Hazel Fox, The Pinochet Case No. 3, 48 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 687 (1999); Colin Warbrick, Extradition Law Aspects of Pinochet 3, 48 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 958 (1999).
4. I focus upon the relationship between law and politics here, in an effort to provide
more “real-life” material for an ongoing interdisciplinary discussion about how legal systems,
both domestic and international, affect how decision-makers behave.  On the relationship be-
tween international law and politics, see generally, LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE:
LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (1968); ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1999); Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L. ORG. 3 (2000); THE ROLE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
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ance, and taking as hostage of thousands of people.  His victims in-
cluded not only Chilean citizens, but also citizens of other countries,
including the United Kingdom and Spain.  His crimes were alleged to
have formed part of an international conspiracy to track down and
murder opponents of his military regime in Chile, the United States,
and elsewhere.5
Some of the crimes, most notably the acts of torture, were
“crimes under international law”—perpetrators of which may be
prosecuted by any state regardless of their nationality, the nationality
of their victims, or the country in which the acts were committed.6
For this reason, at the time of Pinochet’s arrest, there appeared to be
no obstacle to his extradition nor any apparent impediment to his
prosecution in the United Kingdom.7  However, Pinochet’s lawyers
argued that, as Chilean head of state during the period in which most
of the alleged crimes were committed, Pinochet was immune from the
jurisdiction of the British courts, including its extradition procedures.
By doing so, the lawyers forced British judges, first in the Divisional
Court and then in the House of Lords, to choose between two very
different views of international law.
According to the traditional view, only states can be relevant ac-
tors in international law.  States are sovereign and theoretically equal;
it follows that one state cannot be impugned before the courts of an-
other and, inexorably, that a head of state (or a former head of state)
is entitled to claim absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of na-
tional courts, whether in criminal or civil proceedings.8
5. The alleged crimes included the 1976 murder of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C.
See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984).  For details on Chile’s payment of
compensation, see J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 55-58 (1998).  The
U.S. Department of Justice has recently reopend a grand jury investigation into that crime.  See
Frederic L Kirgis, Possible Indictment of Pinochet in the United States, ASIL-INSIGHT (Mar.
2000) < http://www.asil.org/insigh42.htm>.
6. For a discussion of universal jurisdiction, see Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in Interna-
tional Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 145 (1973); Derek Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of
Authority Over Activities and Resources, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1982); STEVEN R. RATNER &
JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 140-41 (1997).
7. Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, c.33, which implemented the 1984
United Nations Torture Convention into British law, affirms the universal jurisdiction of domes-
tic courts to prosecute or extradite those accused of torture.
8. For the traditional doctrine of  “absolute” state (or “sovereign”) immunity, see The
Prins Frederick, 2 Dods. 451, 165 Eng. Rep. 1543 (Adm. 1820); Compania Naviera Vascongada
v. S.S. Cristina, [1938] App. Cas. 458, 490 (judgment of Lord Atkin).  See generally Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
BYERS.DOC 06/22/00  8:18 PM
418 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [10:415
Until recently, state immunity presented an almost insurmount-
able barrier to the effective enforcement of international human
rights by national courts, even when those courts might have been
otherwise willing to exercise jurisdiction.9  Under conceptions of in-
ternational law that had existed for centuries, the idea that a former
sovereign could be hauled up before the courts of another state and
held accountable for gross violations of human rights was almost in-
conceivable.  Since the worst violations of human rights were often
committed (or at least permitted) by heads of state, or other govern-
ment officials, this had serious consequences for authorities responsi-
ble for enforcing international criminal law.
Traditional international law has changed profoundly since the
Second World War.  An alternative view has emerged, positing that
the international community comprises not only states, but individu-
als, peoples, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental or-
ganizations, and corporations.10  These entities have emerged as in-
ternational actors engaged in international discourse and, in some
areas, they have been granted important rights, such as the right of
individuals not to be tortured.11
The new view of international law also goes a crucial step fur-
ther; individuals are able to enforce their most fundamental rights
even against states and state officials.  This was clearly established by
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, which were set up to try alleged
9. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992);
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 507 U.S. 349 (1993); Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 107 I.L.R. 536 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. (April 11) (recognizing the international legal personality of the United Nations); U.N.
SECRETARY GENERAL, THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL:
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949) (describing the Charter’s imposition of
international legal responsibility on individuals).  The principles set out in the Nuremberg
Judgment were subsequently affirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution, 95(I), at 188, U.N.
Doc A/64/Add.1 (1946).  For a discussion of NGOs’ role in global human rights arenas, see gen-
erally Christine Chinkin, Human Rights and the Politics of Representation: Is There a Role for
International Law?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 131 (Michael Byers
ed., 2000).
11. On the right not to be tortured, see International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 7; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452,
U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3452 (1975); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/139/51 (1984) (entered into force
June 26, 1987), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 102 (1984); see also NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT
OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1999).
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war criminals after the Second World War.12  More recently, the prin-
ciple that there is no immunity for anyone with respect to crimes un-
der international law has been incorporated into the statutes and de-
cisions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.13  Moreover, in July 1998, 120 states adopted
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court with jurisdic-
tion over war crimes and crimes against humanity, including those
committed during peacetime.14  The statute expressly provides that
heads of state have no immunity with respect to crimes under interna-
tional law.15
Thus, there is no shortage of substantive content to human rights
and international criminal law, nor is most of the substance new.  The
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted in 1948, set out the
obligations owed to individuals by states and state officials under in-
ternational law, including the obligation not to torture people16—the
principal crime of which Pinochet was accused.  However, the decla-
ration and subsequent human rights treaties failed to provide any
mechanism for the international prosecution of people accused of
crimes under international law.17
12. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, arts. 6-8.  The Charter
was subsequently affirmed by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 95(I), U.N. Doc A/64/Add.1,
at 188 (1946).
13. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended
by U.N.S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998); Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453th mtg., at art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); see also Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No.
IT-99-37-I (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, May 24, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kam-
banda, No. ICTR 97-23-5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Sept. 4, 1998).
14. See generally HERMAN A. M. VON HEBEL, REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ADRIAN BOS (1999); OTTO TRIFFTERER,
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1999);
ROY S. LEE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE
(1999).
15. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc., art. 27,
A/Conf.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].  It should be noted that there is a possible con-
tradiction between Article 27 and Article 98 of the Rome Statute.  Although Article 27 says that
nobody, not even a head of state, benefits from immunity before the Court, see id., Article 98
says that a state is not required to surrender an accused if to do so would violate its obligations
under international law with respect to state or diplomatic immunity, see id.
16. G.A. Res. 17, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 5 (1948).
17. A number of relatively efficacious treaty-based mechanisms do exist, including the Op-
tional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. OPI/598 (Mar.
1976), the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission and Court of
Human Rights.  See generally A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
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Until recently, national courts provided the only enforcement
power over international criminal law.18  Some human rights treaties
stated that the violation of certain rights gave rise to universal juris-
diction on the part of national courts19 and universal jurisdiction over
at least some crimes is widely regarded as existing under customary
international law.20  Numerous countries have implemented these in-
ternational enforcement powers into their national legal systems, as
the United Kingdom did with respect to torture in its Criminal Justice
Act of 1988.21  However, most national courts have been reluctant to
apply universal jurisdiction, other than to war crimes committed dur-
ing the Second World War.22  As a result, many victims of serious hu-
man rights abuses were left with little more than empty words—weak
protection in the face of military dictators and their henchmen.
There are several explanations for the reluctance of national
courts to apply universal jurisdiction.  Judges in national courts are
usually not experts on international law and are often reluctant to
WORLD (4th ed. 1996).  However, these mechanisms only provide for complaints against states,
and not for the prosecution of individuals.  Moreover, the application of these mechanisms all
have a limited scope, whether geographically or in terms of the refusal of many states to ratify
their constitutive treaties.
18. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 139-61.
19. See generally the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War: Convention (I) for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.  For further exam-
ples, see the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Insti-
tutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S 277;
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N.Doc. A/139/51 (1984) (entered into force June 26,
1987), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 102 (1984); International Convention Against the Taking of Hos-
tages, opened for signature Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
20. See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Jm. D.C. 1961), aff'd, 36
I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962); RODLEY, supra note 11; RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 6.
21. See Criminal Justice Act of 1988, supra note 7.  See generally FIONA MCKAY,
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE (June 30, 1999) (writing on behalf of Redress, a charity
“seeking reparation for torture survivors”).
22. The courts of some continental European states have begun to exercise universal juris-
diction with respect to crimes committed more recently, for example, during the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia. See FIONA MCKAY, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE (June 30, 1999).
Following the Pinochet case, in early 2000 a court in Senegal indicted Hissene Habre, the for-
mer head of state of Chad, on charges of torture.  See An African Pinochet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2000, at A30.
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rely heavily on it when rendering their decisions.  In particular, they
may not be fully aware of the rapid and profound changes in the in-
ternational legal system that occurred in the latter half of the twenti-
eth century, especially with respect to human rights and the conse-
quent decline of traditional sovereign prerogatives.  An equally
important explanation concerns the political implications following
from one state’s assertion of jurisdiction over the national of another
state for crimes having no apparent connection with the first state.
Politicians and publics tend to be very attached to traditional con-
cepts of sovereignty and may feel greatly affronted by what—to in-
ternational lawyers—are legitimate applications of widely accepted
rules of international law.  As a result, governments, and perhaps
judges, will weigh the often ambiguous benefits of enforcing interna-
tional criminal law in a specific case against the very real costs that
may result to their country’s political alliances, national security, and
trade.
The Pinochet case raised precisely these issues.  It taxed the
imagination and understanding of more than twenty national judges,
none of whom were specialists in international law, nor young enough
to have studied international law when it was based on anything other
than the traditional, state-centric model.  The case also raised ex-
tremely sensitive political questions concerning the relationship be-
tween European powers and their former colonies and the appropri-
ateness, rather than simply the legality, of interfering in the domestic
affairs of states undergoing delicate transitions from authoritarianism
to democracy.  From the perspective of a changed geopolitical situa-
tion having new and perhaps far less dangerous imperatives than
those that had previously prevailed, the Pinochet case called into
question the wisdom of re-examining anti-communism actions taken
during the Cold War.  Lastly, the case threatened to damage an eco-
nomic relationship of considerable importance, with British compa-
nies having invested heavily in Chile, and with Chile being an impor-
tant market for the British arms industry.
The proceedings in the Pinochet case were thus significant in two
inexorably intertwined respects, one primarily legal and the other
primarily political.  First, the proceedings posed, in the most direct
terms, a choice between two competing visions of the international
legal order.  On the one hand, there was the international law of the
past whereby a head of state could do what he wished and rely, for
the rest of his life, on the fact that he was immune before the courts.
On the other hand, there was the international law of the present and
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future, in which a former head of state was not immune from claims
brought by, or in relation to, egregious wrongs perpetuated on inno-
cent victims.  Second, the proceedings were significant because they
challenged judges and politicians in the United Kingdom to exercise
the universal jurisdiction available to them in a high profile situation
of considerable political sensitivity, where the politically expedient
decision would—almost certainly—have been to set Pinochet free.
The intertwined character of the law and the politics of the Pinochet
case, and the way in which rules and legal institutions constrained the
behavior of politicians and judges, may be best exposed through a
chronological account of the arrest and subsequent proceedings.
III.  THE ARREST
The path towards legal proceedings in the Pinochet case began
with Judge Garzon, the Spanish magistrate, who had developed a file
on Pinochet while investigating crimes against Spanish citizens com-
mitted by the Argentine military junta between 1976 and 1983.  His
research unearthed evidence of a conspiracy code-named “Operation
Condor” whereby the Argentine and Chilean regimes cooperated in
tracking down, torturing, and eliminating their opponents within
those countries and abroad.  After reading a news report of Pino-
chet’s presence in London, Garzon’s research enabled him to fax an
INTERPOL arrest warrant to the Metropolitan Police without the
delay which is usual in such situations—while evidence is gathered,
the authorities ponder the situation, and the suspect flees the coun-
try.23
It was of considerable assistance to Garzon that both Spain and
the United Kingdom had ratified the 1957 European Convention on
Extradition.24  The Convention, adopted under the aegis of the Coun-
cil of Europe, provided for a system of strong judicial cooperation
with respect to the transfer of accused persons between different
23. A recent example of this involved Konrad Kalejs, who was accused of killing thousands
of Jews in Latvia during the Second World War.  Kalejs, now an Australian citizen, had been
deported from the United States and Canada.  Informed of his presence in the United Kingdom,
British authorities began their own investigation, whereupon Kalejs fled the country.  See
Vikram Dodd, War Crime Suspect Flies to Australia: Straw Admits Kalejs Should not have been
Allowed into Britain, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Jan. 7, 2000, available in 2000 WL 2701581.  Inci-
dentally, an opportunity to arrest Pinochet had arisen twice before, in the Netherlands and in
the U.K.; on both occasions, Pinochet fled before prosecuting authorities made any move to ar-
rest him.
24. Opened for signature Dec. 13, 1957, E.T.S. No. 24 <http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/24e.
htm>.  Spain ratified the Convention in 1982 and the United Kingdom in 1991.
BYERS.DOC 06/22/00  8:18 PM
2000] THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE PINOCHET CASE 423
European countries.  Indeed, unlike in most extradition situations,
the degree of cooperation envisaged was so high that requesting
states were not required to produce prima facie evidence of the case
against the accused.25
Upon receiving the INTERPOL arrest warrant from Spain, the
Metropolitan Police quickly sought a British warrant from a local sti-
pendiary magistrate, Nicholas Evans.26  When the police called on Ev-
ans late on the evening of Friday, October 16, 1998,27  Evans immedi-
ately wrote out a warrant that the police used to arrest Pinochet later
that same evening.
In the weeks and months following the arrest, requests for Pino-
chet’s extradition were received from three other countries: Switzer-
land, Belgium, and France.  These requests confirmed that a strong
case existed against Pinochet, that the alleged crimes were crimes un-
der international law, and that Judge Garzon was not acting unrea-
sonably.  Were it not for the Spanish magistrate’s quick reaction to
Pinochet’s presence in London, however, the judicial authorities in
Switzerland, Belgium, and France would never have had the oppor-
tunity to react.
IV.  THE DIVISIONAL COURT
Pinochet (or at least a cadre of his supporters) responded to his
arrest by hiring some of London’s leading criminal defense lawyers.28
They immediately filed a writ of habeas corpus (a demand for the re-
lease of a wrongfully arrested person) before the Divisional Court
(which is sometimes referred to as the “High Court”).  They also
sought leave for judicial review, alleging that Jack Straw, the Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department, had acted wrongfully by not
ordering Pinochet’s release.  The case was heard by a panel of three
25. On the law of extradition more generally, see GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL
FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHANISMS
(1998); M. CHERIF BASSIONNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE (3d. ed. 1996).
26. This is typical practice for countries party to the European Convention on Extradition.
27. There were rumors that the police first consulted with the British Foreign Office, were
told by a lawyer there that Pinochet was not entitled to diplomatic immunity, and relayed this
information to Evans.  The Foreighn Office Legal Adviser was apparently out of the country at
the time.  While the junior lawyer who dealt with the query was correct in his assessment that
there was no diplomatic immunity, he overlooked the issue of state immunity.
28. The legal profession in the United Kingdom is split between solicitors and barristers.
Pinochet hired the solicitors firm of Kingsley Napley.  They in turn hired the barristers Clive
Nicholls, Q.C., and Clare Montgomery, Q.C., to present the oral arguments.
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judges headed by Lord Chief Justice Bingham who, in his previous
career as a barrister, had represented a number of foreign govern-
ments in state immunity proceedings.  The other two judges were
relatively junior by comparison, and had no background in interna-
tional law.
The court quashed the warrant of October 16 on the basis that
there was no “double criminality”: the crimes alleged against Pino-
chet—murder of Spanish citizens in Chile—would not have given ju-
risdiction to a British court in the analogous situation of British citi-
zens murdered abroad.  Double criminality is a basic requirement of
extradition law.  However, in response to a further request received
from Judge Garzon, a second warrant had been issued in the interim.
This second warrant focused on alleged crimes of torture, which was
important because the United Kingdom, through the adoption of the
Criminal Justice Act of 1988, had statutorily provided universal juris-
diction over the crime of torture.  Although Pinochet’s lawyers ar-
gued that British courts did not have jurisdiction over torture commit-
ted abroad before the Act came into force, the judges held that the
critical date for the purposes of double criminality was not the date
the alleged crimes were committed, but rather the date on which the
extradition request was received.29
This ruling on double criminality, however, was not conclusive,
for the judges quashed the second warrant anyway.  They did so on
the grounds that, as a former head of state, Pinochet was entitled to
traditional, absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of British courts.30
Yet the judges ruled without hearing the key arguments against im-
munity.  At this stage, Amnesty International and other international
human rights organizations had not yet sought leave to intervene in
the proceedings.  The Crown Prosecution Service, acting for Spain,
was represented by Alun Jones, Q.C., an expert in extradition law31
who knew next to nothing about state immunity.  The only party to
the case who was aware of the many good (and later, in the House of
Lords, decisive) arguments against immunity was the Secretary of
State.  The “Home Office” had engaged Sir Arthur Watts, Q.C., a
former Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office and the author of the only
monograph ever published on head of state immunity.32  However, at
29. See Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 38 I.L.M. 68, 79 (Q.B. Div’l Ct. 1998).
30. See id. at 85.
31. See generally ALUN JONES, JONES ON EXTRADITION (1995).
32. See Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads
of Governments and Foreign Ministers, 247 Recueil des Cours 1994-III.
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the crucial juncture of the case, James Turner, Q.C., a barrister acting
for the Home Office, rose to his feet and told the judges that the Sec-
retary of State did not wish to take a position on the issue of immu-
nity.  This left the court, even if it had been otherwise inclined, with
little option but to rule in favor of Pinochet.33
In the meantime, Amnesty International and other human rights
organizations asked John Morris, the Attorney-General for England
and Wales, to give his consent for a private prosecution in the United
Kingdom (such consent is required by the torture provisions of the
Criminal Justice Act).34  He refused, citing concerns about immunity
and the application of the Act to crimes committed before that stat-
ute had come into being.35
Both the British Government’s refusal to take a position on the
immunity issue and its refusal to allow a private prosecution stand in
stark contrast to positions adopted by that same government in inter-
national negotiations.  Only three months earlier, at the Rome Con-
ference on a Permanent International Criminal Court, the British
Government had committed itself to making it impossible for even
current heads of state to claim such immunity before domestic or in-
ternational courts.36  Although the United Kingdom played an in-
strumental role in the negotiation of the Rome Statute, before it rati-
fies the statute it will probably have to amend its legislation so as to
deny immunity from criminal jurisdiction to all heads of state—not
just former heads of state like Pinochet—accused of crimes under in-
ternational law.37
Moreover, the Rome Statute adopted an approach to interna-
tional jurisdiction called “complementarity,” whereby the application
of universal jurisdiction by national courts will remain the primary
means of enforcement for international criminal law, with the Inter-
33. See Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. at 77-78.
34. See, e.g., Jamie Wilson & Amelia Gentleman, Pinochet Wins His High Court Battle; He
May be Responsible for 4,000 Deaths, But He Isn’t Going to be Put on Trial Here, GUARDIAN
(LONDON), Oct. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 18674128; see also Criminal Justice Act of 1988,
ch. 33, §135 (Eng.).
35. See, e.g., Geoffrey Bindman, False Immunity: Whatever Hoffmann did Wrong, it is Ab-
surd to Say Pinochet has Diplomatic Privileges; We Should Still Proceed Against Him in the New
Year, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Dec. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 24896659.
36. See Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 27.  See also, however, discussion supra note 15.
37. See State Immunity Act of 1978, §§ 14 & 20 (Eng.).
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national Criminal Court providing a venue for only the most high
profile—or domestically problematic—of cases.38
The Home Secretary’s refusal to adopt a position on immunity in
the Divisional Court and the Attorney General’s refusal to consent to
a private prosecution, strongly suggest that the British Government
would have preferred to have seen Pinochet returned to Chile. In his
public statements, however, Jack Straw was careful to insist that the
matter was one for the courts, and not for politicians.39  The Govern-
ment had undoubtedly been advised that the chances of the courts
ruling against Pinochet were extremely slim, and concluded that the
potential for political damage could dramatically be reduced by hav-
ing it seem that the law was entirely responsible for what, in some
quarters (including the grassroots of the Labour Party), would have
been an extremely unpopular decision.40  For this reason, they would
not have been at all concerned when the Crown Prosecution Service,
at the request of Judge Garzon, appealed the case to the highest court
in the United Kingdom: the House of Lords.
V.  PINOCHET I: STATE IMMUNITY
The House of Lords is both the highest court and the second
chamber of the British Parliament.  However, only twelve members
of the House of Lords sit in what is officially known as the “Judicial
Appeals Committee.”  These “Law Lords” are professional judges
drawn, in most cases, from the Court of Appeal.  One might expect,
therefore, that the case would not have changed significantly on ap-
peal.  However, four factors distinguished the appeal in the House of
Lords from the proceedings in the Divisional Court: (1) the personal
background of the judges; (2) the involvement of counsel specializing
in international law; (3) the significant length of time taken to hear
the case; and (4) an enormous amount of media attention.
By the time the Pinochet case came to the House of Lords, it was
the sort of case that the English legal system seeks to resolve very
quickly.  Because they involve the detention of an individual who has
not yet been tried, extradition cases normally go straight from the Di-
visional Court to the House of Lords, skipping the Court of Appeal.
38. See Rome Statute, supra note 15,  arts. 89-102.  On complementarity more generally
and some of the problems that may arise see Madeline Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Juris-
diction: The Case of Rwanda,  7 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 349 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Rory Carroll et al., Pinochet decision for Straw, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct.
19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 18672006.
40. See Andrew Parker, Ruling Cheers Labour Party, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1998, at 6.
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Pinochet, moreover, was not just a detained individual who had not
yet been tried: he had also been granted immunity by the Divisional
Court—and his detention was causing enormous political controversy,
both in the United Kingdom and abroad.
The House of Lords responded by postponing a hearing in a
refugee case that was about to begin, and reassigning that panel of
judges to the Pinochet case.41  Although it is not entirely clear how in-
dividual Law Lords are assigned to panels, a degree of self-selection
does occur, with refugee cases attracting a somewhat different cross-
section of judges than, for example, commercial law cases.  The panel
reassigned to hear the Pinochet case thus included several of the more
progressive judges on the House of Lords, as well as two of the four
judges most knowledgeable about—and involved in—issues of inter-
national law and human rights.
The presiding judge, Lord Slynn, was Chairman of the Executive
Council of the International Law Association and a former Advocate-
General at the European Court of Justice.  He was widely regarded as
less conservative than most of his colleagues and had written several
important dissents in favor of individual rights in refugee and extradi-
tion cases.42  Lord Hoffmann was a Jewish South African who had
moved to England as a Rhodes Scholar and become an Oxford Fel-
low before taking up a career at the Bar.  Although widely regarded
as the most capable member of the bench, he was also considered
somewhat unpredictable, being progressive on human rights while
conservative in other areas such as conflicts of law.  He was also, as it
later emerged, a director of Amnesty International Charity Limited,
the research and educational branch of Amnesty International.  Lord
Steyn, another South African Rhodes Scholar turned English barris-
ter and then judge, came from an Afrikaners background.  Like
Hoffmann, he had left South Africa in part because of his political
convictions, and had seen an oppressive government in operation
there.  The fourth judge, Lord Nicholls, though something of an un-
known factor, differed from the other Law Lords in one important re-
41. The postponed case was heard in February 1999, with Lord Hoffmann rendering a
landmark judgment for the majority, in favor of a Pakistani woman accused of adultery and
facing death by stoning if she was returned to Pakistan.  See R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal
and another, ex parte Shah, 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L. 1999).  It was Lord Hoffmann’s first judgment
after his 1998 Pinochet I decision.  R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex
parte Pinochet Ugarte, 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L. 1998) annulled by R v. Bow Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2), 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L. 1999).
42. See, e.g., “T” v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2 W.L.R. 706, 2 All E.R
865 (1996).
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spect.  While all of them had been educated at Oxford or Cambridge,
he had risen from more humble beginnings to graduate from the Uni-
versity of Liverpool.  The fifth judge, Lord Lloyd, an arch-
conservative educated at Eaton and Oxford, was thus—on the basis
of his background—the only member of the panel clearly inclined to
rule in favor of Pinochet.43
In principle, the most senior of the Law Lords determines the
composition of panels for individual cases.  In practice, this task is
delegated to one of the “clerks” assigned to the Judicial Appeals
Committee, who consults with the various judges as necessary.  At the
time the Pinochet case reached the House of Lords, the senior judge
was Lord Browne-Wilkinson.  It is unclear whether either Browne-
Wilkinson or the clerk thought about the possible implications of us-
ing the refugee law panel for the Pinochet case.  Perhaps they thought
it inappropriate to consider such factors.  Perhaps they did consider
the implications and assumed, nonetheless, that the unanimous deci-
sion of the Divisional Court would be upheld.  In any event, Browne-
Wilkinson, who chose not to participate in Pinochet I,44 displayed evi-
dent discomfort with the result during the subsequent proceedings
(over which he presided) in Pinochet II45 and Pinochet III.46  This sug-
gests that the first panel’s decision was not what he had expected at
the time that panel’s composition was determined.
Another important difference from the proceedings in the Divi-
sional Court was the active involvement of counsel specializing in
public international law.  The Crown Prosecution Service, having
learned from its failure at first instance, engaged Professor Christo-
pher Greenwood of the London School of Economics to deal with the
state immunity issue on its behalf.  In addition, a coalition of victims
and human rights organizations—including Amnesty International,
the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, and the
Redress Trust—had sought and been granted leave to present oral
arguments.  To represent them, they engaged Professor Ian Brownlie,
Q.C., of Oxford University, the world’s most experienced practitioner
43. See Frances Gibb, Five Were Chosen on Seniority and Availability, TIMES (LONDON),
Nov. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 4878870.
44. R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 3
W.L.R. 1456 (H.L. 1998).
45. R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 2
W.L.R. 272 (H.L. 1999).
46. R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 2
W.L.R. 827 (H.L. 1999).
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of public international law.  Consequently, the arguments against
immunity were clearly and fully put before the court.47
As a result of the inclusion of specialized counsel, and the fuller
range of arguments, the hearings before the House of Lords took
considerably longer than the hearings before the Divisional Court.
This lengthening of the hearings may also have reflected a desire on
the part of the judges not only to do justice, but to be seen to be doing
justice, in light of a fourth factor: an enormous amount of media at-
tention.  October and November 1998 were slow months for interna-
tional news.  There was a lull in the Monica Lewinsky scandal, with
the impeachment of President Clinton having not yet begun.  The
United States had bombed Sudan and Afghanistan in August; the
next series of military strikes—against Iraq—would not begin until
December.  The crisis in Kosovo had not yet escalated; there were no
major election campaigns underway.
There is no question that the Law Lords felt the eyes of the
world upon them.  The entrance to the Houses of Parliament, where
the Judicial Appeals Committee heard the case (in a small and dingy
meeting room) was besieged by hundreds of journalists for the full
two weeks of the hearings.  This unprecedented amount of attention
would not have been welcomed by a court that, in many respects, is a
constitutional relic from centuries past.  Among other things, it raised
questions about the process by which Law Lords are appointed, about
the fact that they are so clearly unrepresentative of modern British
society, and about their ability to take on a much more important role
in managing social change following, on November 9, 1998, the incor-
poration of the European Convention of Human Rights into British
law.48  Add to this the fact that the Pinochet case was being heard in
the lead up to the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,49 on December 10, 1998, and it be-
comes hardly surprising that three of the five judges were prepared to
consider—and apply—recent developments in international human
rights and international criminal law.
On November 25, 1998, Lords Nicholls, Steyn, and Hoffmann
held that Pinochet had no immunity from the jurisdiction of British
courts with respect to his alleged crimes under international law—and
47. Human Rights Watch sought to intervene independently of the coalition, but was
granted leave only to submit written arguments.
48. See Human Rights Act of 1998 (Eng.).
49. G.A. Res. 17, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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thus no immunity from extradition.50  The judgment, coincidentally,
was handed down on Pinochet’s eighty-third birthday, although it was
celebrated as a birthday gift for international human rights.  The
judgment indicated that at least one particularly influential national
court was prepared to deny immunity—and recognize and apply uni-
versal jurisdiction—with respect to serious human rights violations
committed after the Second World War.
The majority decided the case on simple, if not analytically rig-
orous grounds, holding that a head of state who ordered or commit-
ted torture was not, when so doing, acting as a head of state.  Lord
Steyn wrote:
[T]he development of international law since the Second World
War justifies the conclusion that by the time of the 1973 coup
d’état, and certainly ever since, international law condemned geno-
cide, torture, hostage taking and crimes against humanity (during
an armed conflict or in peace time) as international crimes deserv-
ing of punishment.  Given this state of international law, it seems to
me difficult to maintain that the commission of such high crimes
may amount to acts performed in the exercise of the functions of a
Head of State.51
The judgment was of fundamental importance.  It signaled that the
most basic human rights are enforceable against anyone, regardless of
conflicting rules of international law that might otherwise apply.  Al-
though no other national court of final appeal had ever gone this far,
the authority and influence of the Law Lords is such that the decision
seemed destined to be studied closely, and in all likelihood followed
by other courts around the world.
VI.  THE HOME SECRETARY
Following the Law Lords’ ruling against immunity, the focus of
attention shifted to the responsible cabinet minister: Jack Straw.  As
Secretary of State for the Home Department, he was required by the
Extradition Act 1989 to make a quasi-judicial decision, either to allow
the extradition process to continue, or to release Pinochet.52  The gov-
ernments of Chile and the United States, in particular, exerted con-
siderable pressure on him to choose the second option.53  Yet to do so
50. See the Law Lords’ Pinochet I decision, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 3 W.L.R. 1456; see
also Michael Byers, The Right Rule for Humanity, TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 26, 1998, at 24.
51. See ex parte Pinochet, 3 W.L.R. at 1506.
52. See Extradition Act of 1989, ch. 33, part XII, sched. 158 (1994) (Eng.).
53. See Ewen Macaskill et al., US Urges Pinochet Return Quiet Pressure by Washington
Adds to Dilemma for Straw, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Nov. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL
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would have placed the United Kingdom in violation of international
law, including its treaty obligations under the Torture Convention
and the European Convention on Extradition.54  Moreover, the Home
Secretary might well have found his exercise of discretion subjected
to judicial review in the British courts.55  Most importantly, releasing
Pinochet on discretionary grounds would have put Straw—and the
entire British Government—in direct conflict with the wave of favor-
able public opinion that had greeted the decision of the House of
Lords, both domestically and abroad.  At this point, for a governing
party that was explicitly committed to an “ethical foreign policy”56
and whose grassroots remained firmly committed to socialist ideals,
there was in reality no scope for exercising the discretion that was
available under domestic law.  On December 9, 1998, Straw decided,
as he had publicly insisted all along, that Pinochet’s extradition was a
judicial matter, and not a political one.57
VII.  PINOCHET II: APPEARANCE OF BIAS
Following Jack Straw’s decision to allow the extradition process
to continue, Pinochet was required to appear before a magistrate.  It
seemed inevitable that he would one day face justice in Spain.  At this
point, his lawyers played their trump card.  It was widely known in
London legal circles that Lord Hoffmann’s wife worked for Amnesty
International.  Less widely known—but much more important—was
18680301.  The United States government was apparently concerned that a trial involving Pino-
chet might reveal the true extent of CIA involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende, and
perhaps in the atrocities that followed.  See id.
54. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 11, art. 5; European Convention on Extra-
dition, supra note 24, art. 1 (“The Contracting Parties undertake to surrender to each other,
subject to the provisions and conditions laid down in this Convention, all persons against whom
the competent authorities of the requesting Party are proceeding for an offence or who are
wanted by the said authorities for the carrying out of a sentence or detention order.”).
55. In fact, Amnesty International and the other human rights organizations started pro-
ceedings in the Divisional Court in anticipation of the Home Secretary’s decision, seeking an
order that would have kept Pinochet in the country until a review of the decision could be made.
Their request was denied on the basis that it was premature.  See Jaime Wilson et al., Straw
Rules Pinochet Extradition Can Go Ahead: You Can Hide, General, But You Can’t Run,
GUARDIAN (LONDON), Dec. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 24894533.
56. See Robin Cook, Speech by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Robin Cook, at the Launch of
the FCO Mission Statement, Locarno Suite, FCO, London (May 12, 1997) <www.fco.gov.uk/
news/speechtext.asp?892>.
57. H.C. HANSARD, col. 213-17 (Dec. 9, 1998) <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/>; TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 23399842 (containing ex-
cerpts of letter, which explains the Secretary of State’s reasons for allowing the extradition to
proceed).
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the fact that Hoffmann himself served as a director of Amnesty In-
ternational Charity Limited, the organization’s research and educa-
tional branch.  Knowledge of the connections contributed a trump
card because Amnesty’s International Secretariat, along with a num-
ber of other human rights organizations and several of Pinochet’s vic-
tims, had been granted the right to make oral representations just a
few short days before the hearings in the House of Lords began.
It was at this point that Lord Hoffmann should have disclosed his
connections with Amnesty International.  Had he done so, it is un-
likely that anyone would have objected to his participating in the
case.  Instead, he wrongly assumed, either that it was sufficient that
his connections were widely known, or that his reputation as an out-
standingly rigorous and objective judge somehow made him immune
from any possible allegations of bias, or that the pressure to hear the
case quickly somehow justified his silence.
Pinochet’s lawyers were well aware that they did not have to
demonstrate the existence of actual bias.  They needed only to dem-
onstrate the appearance of bias, and for this the legal link between
Hoffmann (as a director) and Amnesty International Charity Limited
(as a company) was critical.  The appearance of bias resulting from
this link meant that the Pinochet I judgment of November 25, 199858
had to be overturned.59  Every person, including Pinochet, has the
right to due process of law.
The Law Lords sit as the highest court in the United Kingdom.
Never before had one of them been accused of the appearance of
bias, and no procedure existed for an appeal of this kind to be heard.
Fortunately, the British constitution is not a written document, but
rather a collection of mostly unwritten—and therefore inherently
flexible—customs, conventions, and rules.60  It is also based on a long
tradition of the rule of law.  It was this tradition, and the maturity and
inherent flexibility of the British constitution, which made it possible
for the Law Lords to fashion a new procedure and form a new panel
of five judges to hear arguments concerning the appearance of bias.
By doing so, they modified the British constitution for the better, rec-
58. R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 3
W.L.R. 1456 (H.L. 1998).
59. The Pinochet I decision, id., was annulled by Pinochet II, R v. Bow Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L. 1999).
60. See generally COLIN TURPIN, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION (3d ed.
1995); RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH
GOVERNMENT (3d ed. 1999).
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ognizing that even Law Lords are not above the legal system they
head.
However, the decision to form a new panel and hear the com-
plaint—and the subsequent finding of an appearance of bias—meant
that all of the arguments for and against immunity had to be heard
again; the initial decision was void.  Pinochet’s lawyers now had a
second chance to make their case: this time to a panel of seven Law
Lords.
VIII.  PINOCHET III: STATE IMMUNITY AND
DOUBLE CRIMINALITY
The Judicial Appeals Committee has twelve active members, al-
though sometimes retired Law Lords or other senior members of the
judiciary are called upon to fill out panels.  A seven-judge panel was
constituted to re-hear the Pinochet case, so as to lend greater author-
ity to the new decision in this highly unusual situation.  Six of the
seven judges were full-time Law Lords who had not served in Pino-
chet I (although four of them had served in Pinochet II).  The seventh
judge was Lord Goff, a recent retiree who had heard several previous
state immunity cases.61  On the whole, the new panel appeared to be
somewhat more conservative than the initial panel of five.  Among
the “conservatives” were Lords Goff, Saville, and Hutton, the latter
from Northern Ireland and a strong opponent of terrorism.
An additional party was added to the proceedings when the
Government of Chile was granted leave to intervene.  Chile was rep-
resented by Lawrence Collins, Q.C., one of the United Kingdom’s
leading experts on jurisdiction and the conflict of laws.62  In part be-
cause of the addition of another party, and in part because the law-
yers on all sides had had additional time to research and prepare their
arguments, the hearings in Pinochet III63 lasted a full three weeks.
This was a record for the House of Lords: another anomaly in a
highly anomalous case.
Public perception of the court would have weighed heavily on
the minds of the seven judges, not only in terms of the overwhelm-
ingly positive domestic and international reaction to the judgment of
61. See, e.g., Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co. & Republic of Iraq, [1995] 1
W.L.R. 1147 (H.L. 1995).
62. See DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Lawrence Collins ed., 13th ed.
2000).
63. R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 2
W.L.R. 827 (H.L. 1999).
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November 25, 1998, but also in terms of the court’s internal consis-
tency.  To overrule the decision of the initial panel would have been
to suggest that justice was only luck of the draw, that different panels
of judges on the same court in the same case could—and would—
render completely different rulings.  At a time when major
constitutional changes were already being made, including the
devolution of power to Scotland and Wales, the incorporation of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the elimination of
hereditary membership in the House of Lords (as the second chamber
of Parliament), the last thing the Law Lords wanted was to suggest
that the Judicial Appeals Committee was itself in need of reform.64
The Law Lords were also aware that the Home Secretary had al-
ready exercised his discretion in favor of a continuation of the extra-
dition process.  This had two consequences.  First, it indicated to the
judges that the executive branch was not firmly opposed to the extra-
dition.  Second, it meant that responsibility for making the decision
now rested squarely upon the court.  The judges—and not Jack
Straw—would be regarded as responsible for whatever happened to
Pinochet.
In what may have been a coincidence of timing, but could not
have been better planned, the Law Lords handed down their judg-
ment on March 24, 1999—the same day that NATO aircraft began
dropping bombs on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  The story
was lost in the media frenzy over the Kosovo War.
Even if the judgment had been subjected to full public scrutiny,
the court had carefully protected itself against criticism.  Although a
majority of six upheld the decision denying immunity in Pinochet I,
five of the judges decided the issue on grounds that were somewhat
different from those applied by the initial panel.  Instead of basing
their decision on customary international law, they relied primarily on
the Torture Convention and the Criminal Justice Act 1988.  This ap-
proach, limiting the denial of immunity to those instances where uni-
versal jurisdiction had specifically been accepted by way of treaty and
statute, was inherently more conservative than that of the first panel.
Only one judge, Lord Millett, relied extensively on customary inter-
national law, while another, Lord Goff, wrote a dissenting judgment
that upheld immunity.
64. On recent and proposed changes to the House of Lords, see LORD WAKEHAM, A
HOUSE FOR THE FUTURE: ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, 2000, <http://www.official-
documents.co.uk/document/cm45/4534/contents.htm>; John Vincent, All That Matters is What
Tony Wants, 22-6 LONDON REV. BOOKS 11 (Mar. 16, 2000).
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The judges also re-introduced the issue of double criminality into
the case.65  The Divisional Court had decided, with no apparent diffi-
culty, that the date of the extradition request was the date at which a
British court had to have had jurisdiction over analogous crimes, and
thus worded the issue on appeal accordingly.66  The first panel of Law
Lords had agreed with the Divisional Court on this point and quickly
dismissed the efforts of Pinochet’s lawyers to move beyond the issue
on appeal.67
However, the Crown Prosecution Service, acting on behalf of the
Spanish magistrate, made a serious tactical mistake in Pinochet III.
Alun Jones, Q.C., raised, as his lead argument, the issue of acts of tor-
ture committed or ordered by Pinochet prior to the September 11,
1973 coup, as well as the issue of torture committed after the coup but
before Pinochet was appointed head of state.68  Jones’ reasoning was
simple: even under traditional international law, a former head of
state could not have immunity with respect to acts of torture commit-
ted before he became head of state.
Faced with this argument, Pinochet’s lawyers fought to convince
the judges that they had to look again at the issue of double criminal-
ity, and pointed to the considerable length of time between Septem-
ber 1973 and the receipt of the arrest warrant in October 1998.  The
Law Lords, ignoring the limited scope of the issue on appeal, allowed
Pinochet’s lawyers to present detailed arguments on this point—but
did so only after the Crown Prosecution Service and the interveners
had made their principal arguments, all of which, of course, focused
on the issue of immunity.
The crucial issue (in terms of the extradition of Pinochet, though
not for international human rights more broadly), had thus become
whether, at the time that the alleged crimes had been committed, the
British courts had jurisdiction over acts of torture committed abroad.
Lord Brown-Wilkinson’s approach to the issue is representative of
that taken by six of the seven Law Lords: he assumed that universal
65. See supra text accompanying note 29.
66. The Divisional Court had certified “that a point of law of general public importance is
involved in the Court’s decision, namely the proper interpretation and scope of the immunity
enjoyed by a former Head of State from arrest and extradition proceedings in the United King-
dom in respect of acts committed when he was Head of State.”  Augusto Pinochet Ugarte,
[1999] 38 I.L.M. 68, 86 (Q.B. Div’l Ct. 1998).
67. See R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 3
W.L.R. 1456 at 1462.
68. See R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 2
W.L.R. 827, 836 (H.L. 1999).
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jurisdiction could only be provided by way of treaty, and not custom-
ary international law—even if customary law had achieved the status
of jus cogens.  The following passage, written in the context of his dis-
cussion of state immunity, makes this assumption clear:
I have doubts whether, before the coming into force of the Torture
Convention, the existence of the international crime of torture as
jus cogens was enough to justify the conclusion that the organisa-
tion of state torture could not rank for immunity purposes as per-
formance of an official function.  At that stage there was no inter-
national tribunal to punish torture and no general jurisdiction to
permit or require its punishment in domestic courts.  Not until
there was some form of universal jurisdiction for the punishment of
the crime of torture could it really be talked about as a fully consti-
tuted international crime.  But in my judgment the Torture Con-
vention did provide what was missing: a worldwide universal juris-
diction.69
In terms of its understanding of the relationship between cus-
tomary international law and treaties, this reasoning is clearly
flawed—not least because it misses much of the point of jus cogens
rules: they override and are superior to other rules, which suggests
that a jus cogens rule without a treaty would be just as effective in
overriding an immunity rule as a jus cogens rule with a treaty.70  More
important, however, was the fact that by relying solely on the Torture
Convention as a basis for universal jurisdiction, the judges left all but
one of the alleged acts of torture in the arrest warrant outside the
scope of double criminality.  In recognition of this (and clearly sig-
naling their own intentions) the Law Lords recommended that the
Home Secretary reconsider his authorization of the extradition proc-
ess.  Despite not having directly overruled the judgment of November
25, 1998, the second panel of judges, with the exception of Lord Mil-
lett—and possibly Lord Hutton—clearly desired that Pinochet be al-
lowed to leave for Chile.  Like the Home Secretary, however, the
judges were not prepared to take on the responsibility for that deci-
sion themselves, at a time when public opinion—both domestic and
international—was clearly and overwhelmingly in favor of a contrary
result.
69. See id. at 847.
70. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 53, 64, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).  See also LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY
NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988); STEFAN KADELBACH, ZWINGENDES
VÖLKERRECHT (1992); Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship Between Jus Cogens
and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 211 (1997).
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I mention Lord Hutton as a possible exception because of an epi-
sode that took place during the hearings—an episode that reinforces
the importance of the background of each and every individual actor
in situations such as these.  One would have expected Lord Hutton, as
an arch-conservative from Northern Ireland, to have ruled in favor of
Pinochet.  Indeed, during the hearings he initially appeared bored and
uninterested—until one day, Alun Jones, Q.C., arguing for the Crown
Prosecution Service, mentioned the word “terrorism.”  At this point,
Lord Hutton sat bolt upright and asked for an elaboration.  Jones ex-
plained that Pinochet and other military officers had plotted and
staged a coup against a democratically elected government, and that
the formal extradition request included several charges of terrorism.
From that point onwards, counsel for the human rights organizations,
at least, were convinced that Hutton had switched sides—a conviction
that was born out, in part, by his siding with the majority against im-
munity, even if the terrorism charges themselves were held not to
ground jurisdiction for other reasons.
IX.  UNFIT TO STAND TRIAL
Following the judgment in Pinochet III, Jack Straw was again
faced with the question of whether to grant authority for the extradi-
tion to proceed.  The fact that he did so, on April 14, 1999, is testi-
mony again to the influence of international and domestic public
opinion, and to the constraining effect of his previous assertions—that
the extradition was a judicial and not a political issue—on his subse-
quent behavior.
An extradition hearing took place in the Bow Street Magistrates
Court, with Deputy Chief Stipendiary Magistrate Ronald Bartle con-
sidering not only the few charges that had survived the March 24,
1999 judgment in Pinochet III, but also a number of new charges sub-
sequently filed by Judge Garzon.  All of the new charges concerned
acts of torture committed after 1988, and were thus permissible under
the Law Lords’ restrictive interpretation of double criminality.  On
October 8, 1999, the magistrate ruled that Pinochet could indeed be
extradited to Spain, and committed him on thirty-four charges of tor-
ture and one charge of conspiracy to commit torture.71
In response to this decision the Chilean Government requested,
on October 14, 1999, that the Home Secretary consider releasing Pi-
71. See Jamie Wilson et al., Cheers and Tears as Court Rules Pinochet can be Extradited for
Torture Trial, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 9, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25737759.
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nochet on medical grounds.  Straw responded by arranging for a
medical examination by four prominent British doctors.  The exami-
nation took place on January 5, 2000 and established that Pinochet
was unfit to stand trial—though the report presented to Straw was not
released to the press or, more importantly, to the foreign judicial
authorities requesting Pinochet’s extradition.  This, it was explained,
was because of medical confidentiality.  Instead, Straw merely de-
clared that, on the basis of what he had seen, he was “minded” to or-
der the release of Pinochet.72
Human rights organizations and the Belgian government (one of
the countries that, in addition to Spain, had an arrest warrant out-
standing against Pinochet) challenged Straw’s decision not to release
the report.  This challenge was successful; the Divisional Court ruled
on February 15, 2000 that the report had to be shared—under strict
confidentiality—with the judicial authorities in each of the requesting
states.  Despite efforts to prevent the report’s content from becoming
public knowledge, by February 16, 2000, it had been leaked to the
media.  It was now apparent that Pinochet was indeed very ill, that he
was suffering from extensive brain damage, that his memory had been
severely affected, and that he would be incapable of sufficiently fol-
lowing the process of a trial so as to instruct his lawyers.73  At this
point, the way was clear for Straw to do what he had wanted to do all
along: to call off the extradition and send Pinochet back to Chile.
When this happened, on March 2, 2000, it met with hardly any criti-
cism, even from those who had been most strongly opposed to Pino-
chet’s release.
X.  CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS
This Essay takes a broad view of the Pinochet case, examining
the role of a range of actors extending well beyond the judges and
lawyers who are normally associated with legal developments of this
kind.  In doing so, it exposes that legal and political actors are moti-
vated by a variety of often-conflicting factors and interests that in-
clude much more than a simple desire to “apply” the law.  For exam-
72. See H.C. HANSARD, col. 279 (Jan. 12, 2000) <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/>; Nicholas Watt & Jamie Wilson, Pinochet Failed Senility Test: Straw Left With ‘No
Choice’ After Team of Doctors Declared Former Dictator Mentally Incapable, GUARDIAN
(LONDON), Jan. 13, 2000, available in 2000 WL 2703118.
73. See Jose Luis De La Serna, Deterioro Cerebral Importante, EL MUNDO, Feb. 16, 2000 <
http://www.el-mundo.es/2000/02/16/internacional/16N0048.html>.
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ple, the British government was clearly caught between an expressed
desire to uphold international criminal law and protect human rights,
and an unexpressed desire to avoid the political and economic risks
associated with having such a controversial series of events unfold on
British soil.
The Chilean and Spanish governments were caught in similar
binds.  According to some rumors, many members of the Chilean
government were secretly pleased that Pinochet had been arrested
overseas and thus removed from the domestic political scene.  Indeed,
there are those who attribute the victory of Socialist candidate Ri-
cardo Lagos in the January 16, 2000 presidential election to Pino-
chet’s absence from Chile.74  There is a sense that, thanks to the ar-
rest, the country was finally able to close the chapter on the Pinochet
years. The announcement, by President Lagos immediately after his
election, that immunity from prosecution in Chile would no longer be
accorded to Pinochet, is but one example of the positive effect that
the situation has had on the development of Chilean democracy.75
Nevertheless, throughout the case, and especially during the hearings
in Pinochet III, the Chilean government felt compelled, for domestic
political reasons, to claim the sovereign right to have Pinochet tried in
Chile, and not abroad.
The Spanish government clearly had mixed feelings about pro-
ceedings of this kind against the former leader of a former Spanish
colony—and a country with which Spain maintains important cultural
and economic links.  These mixed feelings were perhaps most appar-
ent when Spain decided against joining Belgium and the human rights
organizations in challenging Jack Straw’s decision not to release the
medical report.76  However, like the British government, the Spanish
government was constrained by the fact that the investigation and ex-
tradition request constituted a judicial and not a political process.
A variety of other actors added to the complex picture presented
in the Pinochet case.  First, there were the human rights organiza-
tions, whose efforts to apply and develop international criminal law
were clearly in fulfillment of their own mandates, but who also bene-
fited enormously—in terms of fundraising and membership—from
74. See Clifford Krauss, In Chile’s Vote Today, Candidates Converge in Center, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2000, §1, at 6.
75. See Clifford Krauss, Man in the News: Ricardo Lagos Escobar; A Chilean Socialist in
the Clinton-Blair Mold, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2000, at A3.
76. See Warren Hoge, Pinochet Foes Are Granted An Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2000, at
A9.
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their close involvement in such a high profile case.77  These organiza-
tions, with their transnational networks of activists and their connec-
tions with judicial authorities in different countries, were critical in
bringing the various strands of the case together: of accused, of vic-
tims, of willing prosecutor, and of available jurisdiction.78  They had
also been crucial in establishing some of the legal institutions that fig-
ured prominently in the case, most notably the Torture Convention.79
Second, there were the journalists and their employers, who saw the
drama in the story and seized upon it to attract and maintain audience
interest in what would otherwise have been a slow period for news.
Lastly, something of a more disturbing—and much less noticeable—
role was played by those transnational corporations who helped fund
Pinochet’s legal defense80 and whose involvement bore a striking re-
semblance to the role of other corporations (most notably ITT) in Pi-
nochet’s rise to power in 1973.81
The existence and involvement of these multiple actors presents
a complexity that challenges any attempt to understand the full di-
mensions of the Pinochet case.  On the one hand, the complexity
demonstrates that multiple factors were at work, that legal rules and
institutions were only part of the picture, and that politics were also
intrinsically involved.  On the other hand, and contrary to what some
might have assumed, the arrest and detention of Pinochet was not
strictly about politics.  Law and politics were interacting constantly
throughout this period, constraining some actors, and empowering
others.  The constraining effects of the law were most apparent upon
the governments of Chile and the United Kingdom, as well as upon
the judges in Pinochet III.
In terms of empowerment, the law was of greatest assistance to
Pinochet’s individual victims, and to the human rights organizations
77. For a sense of the importance of the Pinochet case to the two largest international hu-
man rights organizations see Amnesty International’s website <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news
/pinochet/ background.html> (containing links to background information on Pinochet and the
latest and archived news and reports) and Human Rights Watch’s website <http://www.hrw.org/
hrw/campaigns/chile98/> (containing news briefs and links to further dispatches).
78. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Global Networks,
in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 4.
79. See RODLEY, supra note 11, at 20-21.
80. On the funding of Pinochet’s legal team, see, e.g., Jamie Wilson & Burhan Wazir, Pino-
chet Challenges Law Lord Lawyers Allege Bias in Ruling, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Dec. 5, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 18681270.
81. See generally Intelligence Activities: Senate Resolution 21, Hearings Before the Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities:
Vol. 7, Covert Action, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.  158-60 (1975).
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that took up their cause – both on its own merits, and as a means of
further developing the law.  The significance of their success extends
far beyond providing an essential sense of redress for Pinochet’s vic-
tims.  The development of international human rights and the more
recent growth of an “international civil society” reflect an interna-
tional system that is slowly but surely embracing the rule of law.  Only
in a world with generally accepted rules and institutions is there space
for individuals and human rights groups to flourish, to challenge the
prerogatives of state sovereignty (along with its cynical politics and
reliance on military and economic power), with moral authority and
the slow but sure evolution of binding rules and effective judicial pro-
cesses.
There are two great ironies in the Pinochet case.  One is that Pi-
nochet, as head of state, would have been the person who signed
Chile’s ratification of the 1984 Torture Convention.  The other is that
Pinochet himself, as early as 1968, had recognized the legal develop-
ments that eventually led to his downfall.82
82. See UGARTE, supra note 1.
